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Abstract
Our society nowadays is governed by complex networks, examples being the power grids, telecommunication
networks, biological networks, and social networks. It has become of paramount importance to understand and
characterize the dynamic events (e.g. failures) that might happen in these complex networks. For this reason, in this
paper, we propose two measures to evaluate the vulnerability of complex networks in two different dynamic multiple
failure scenarios: epidemic-like and cascading failures. Firstly, we present epidemic survivability (ES), a new network
measure that describes the vulnerability of each node of a network under a specific epidemic intensity. Secondly,
we propose cascading survivability (CS), which characterizes how potentially injurious a node is according to a
cascading failure scenario. Then, we show that by using the distribution of values obtained from ES and CS it is
possible to describe the vulnerability of a given network. We consider a set of 17 different complex networks to
illustrate the suitability of our proposals. Lastly, results reveal that distinct types of complex networks might react
differently under the same multiple failure scenario.
Index Terms
Network Characterization, Epidemics, Cascading Failures, Multiple Failures, Complex Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Telecommunication networks, power grids, water distribution networks, transport networks or fuel distribution
networks are critical infrastructures that play a vital role in our modern society. Such crucial networks do not display
regular organizations, ergo they have also been addressed as complex networks. The study of complex networks not
only comprises critical infrastructures, but also any other kind of network with non-trivial features. Social networks,
biological networks, online social networks and mobile social networks [1] are solid examples of complex networks.
Our society of nowadays is governed by complex networks. For instance, people have become more and more
dependent on communication networks, either for business or leisure purposes. In addition, this dependency is
expected to grow, considering the myriad of new emerging technologies and services such as smart-cities, cloud
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2computing, e-Health, the Internet of the Things, MANETs, etc. Consequently, the period of time for which a user
can operate terminals without network connectivity is becoming very short; and if a large-scale failure occurred,
it would impact a significant percentage of the world’s population. Another example is the online social networks
such as Twitter or Facebook. In August 2013 a single tweet of a billionaire investor made Apple shares rise over
$500 [2], showing how a single message can spread and reach millions of users within hours. These two examples
depict how important it is to understand the events that might occur on complex networks. From now on, in this
work we are going to use the term failure to refer to any event that causes disruption in the normal functioning of
a complex network.
Many different protection and restoration techniques for single failures have been extensively analyzed in recent
decades (e.g. see [3]). Furthermore, multiple failures such as natural disasters or physical attacks have also been
studied [4]. According to the taxonomy introduced in [5], there are two types of multiple failures. While static
multiple failures are essentially one-off failures that affect one or more elements (nodes or links) simultaneously at
any given point, dynamic failures have a temporal dimension. In this paper we consider dynamic multiple failures,
which we implement through epidemic and cascading failures. On one hand, an epidemic-like failure propagation
occurs when, at a given time, a node or a group of them start spreading an infection. In this case the failure (e.g.
infection) propagates through physical neighbors. On the other hand, cascading failures occur when a node (or a
group of them) fails, and as a consequence, other parts in the network fail as well due to an overloading of the
capacity. Cascading failures do not necessarily propagate through physical contact, i.e. one node failure can cause
a failure to a non-adjacent node due to the network load balancing.
In contrast with single failures, in the case of multiple failures it is nonviable to define proper reactive strategies.
Thus, since the reasonable approach to address such large-scale failures involves the designing phase of a network,
it has become of paramount importance to define new metrics able to evaluate the vulnerability of networks in the
case of multiple failure scenarios. Appropriate metrics can help network engineers and operators to detect the most
critical parts of a network. Although a new generic metric suitable to accurately evaluate the robustness in static
multiple failure scenarios has been recently presented in [5], to the best of our knowledge there are no metrics able
to evaluate the robustness under dynamic multiple failure scenarios.
In our previous work [6] we presented a metric called epidemic survivability. In this paper we go one step further
and we extend the work by considering broader type of failures: dynamic multiple failures. In addition, we extend
the number of networks considered for testing of the failure scenarios to 17, as compared to 6 in the previous work.
Consequently, here we consider 2 telecommunication networks, 2 Internet Autonomous Systems (AS) networks, 5
synthetic generated networks, 1 biological network, 3 social networks and 4 power grid networks. Our aim is to
take into account a wide range of different types of complex networks, and evaluate them under dynamic multiple
failure scenarios. Within this context, the main contributions of this paper are:
1) a new network measure called epidemic survivability (ES). This feature describes the vulnerability of each
node of a network under a specific epidemic scenario.
2) a new network measure called cascading survivability (CS), which characterizes how potentially injurious a
3node is according to a specific cascading failure scenario.
We believe that our proposals can be used by the network research community to evaluate the criticality of nodes
of a network under failure propagation scenarios. In addition, our metrics can be used to amplify general recovery
metrics such as [7].
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Section II presents the set of network topologies considered
in this paper. In Section III we (a) introduce the state of the art related with epidemic failures; (b) review the most
well-known epidemic models; (c) present our new network measure called epidemic survivability; and (d) show a
practical example of how could our proposal be used. Then, Section IV (a) provides a background with respect
to cascading failures; (b) presents several remarkable cascading failure models; (c) defines our new metric called
cascading survivability; and (d) illustrates how to use the metric. Finally, Section V concludes this work reviewing
its main contributions and findings.
II. NETWORK TOPOLOGIES
In this section we present the set of seventeen network topologies considered in our work. These networks have
been chosen in order to represent a wide variety of complex network topology types. Generating representative
synthetic topologies is a difficult task (and it is not the objective of this paper). Thus, we have conducted an
extensive investigation and we have obtained seventeen networks from several sources, which are described next
(the name of each network includes the number of nodes):
1) abilene93 (Fig. 1a): a small network that has been chosen because of its underlying AS topology structure.
2) cogentco197 (Fig. 1b): a real telecommunications network that has been taken from the repository provided
in [8].
3) er400 (Fig. 1c): a random network that has been generated using the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model [9].
4) powerlaw400 (Fig. 1d): a power-law network that has been generated using the Baraba´si-Albert (BA, prefer-
ential attachment mechanism) model [10].
5) homoge400 (Fig. 1f): a homogeneous network (a network where all the nodes have equal node degree) that
has been generated, being a toroidally-periodic rectangular lattice of size 20 × 20. Although this network is
not a complex network, it has been considered for comparison purposes.
6) bt400 (Fig. 1e): this topology has been obtained by manipulating a previously generated topology using BRITE.
7) bo1458 (Fig. 1g): a protein interaction network for yeast [11].
8) col4158 (Fig. 1h): a collaboration network of Arxiv’s General Relativity category [12].
9) col8638 (Fig. 2a): a collaboration network of Arxiv’s High Energy Physics Theory category [12].
10) cost37 (Fig. 2b): a Pan-european communications reference network.
11) europg1494 (Fig. 2c): an approximated model of the european power grid network [13].
12) fb4039 (Fig. 2d): this network represents circles or friends list of the popular social network Facebook [14].
13) wspg4941 (Fig. 2e): a topology of the Western States Power Grid of the United States [15].
4(a) abilene93 (b) cogentco197 (c) er400 (d) powerlaw400
(e) bt400 (f) homoge400 (g) bo1458 (h) col4158
Fig. 1. Layout of 8 out of the 17 topologies considered in this work.
14) pgieee118 and pgieee300 (Fig. 2f and Fig. 2g): these two topologies are reference IEEE power grid networks
[16].
15) AS25357: an AS network from 2012 [17].
16) AS26475: this network is the largest CAIDA AS connected graph from the network set available in November
2007 [12].
The col4158, col8638, fb4039 and AS26475 networks have been obtained from the SNAP dataset [18]. The layouts
of 15 of the 17 topologies can be observed in Figs. 1 and 2. All of the networks are connected and considered as
symmetric graphs. It is worth noting that some of the networks were not connected, and a post-processing has been
done in order to obtain the largest connected component. Table I shows the networks that have been post-processed
because they were disconnected. Furthermore, Table II and Table III present several characteristics of this set of
networks, some of which are presented with their standard deviation. As it can be observed, we have considered
a heterogeneous set of networks with respect to the number of nodes, ranging from 37 to 26475.
The fb4039 network shows the highest average nodal degree (〈k〉 = 43.69), what means that every person has
an average of about 44 friends in this social network. The two AS networks (AS25357 and AS26475) present the
5(a) col8638 (b) cost37 (c) europg1494 (d) fb4039
(e) wspg4941 (f) pgieee118 (g) pgieee300
Fig. 2. Layout of 7 out of the 17 topologies considered in this work.
TABLE I
NETWORKS THAT WERE DISCONNECTED AND FOR WHICH A POST-PROCESSING HAS BEEN DONE TO OBTAIN THE LARGEST CONNECTED
COMPONENT.
Topology List of |N |× number of components
bo1458 1458× 1; 7× 4; 6× 3; 5× 5; 4× 10; 3× 25; 2× 101; 1× 24
col4158 4158× 1; 14× 1; 12× 1; 10× 1; 9× 2; 8× 6;
7× 8; 6× 12; 5× 17; 4× 30; 3× 98; 2× 177; 1× 1
col8638 8638× 1; 21× 1; 11× 1; 9× 2; 8× 6; 7× 11;
6× 8; 5× 21; 4× 45; 3× 67; 2× 264; 1× 2
europg1494 1494× 1; 1× 19
AS25357 25357× 1; 2× 5
6TABLE II
MAIN NETWORK FEATURES. THE TABLE DISPLAYS, FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: TOPOLOGY NAME, NUMBER OF NODES, AVERAGE NODAL
DEGREE ± standard deviation (STDEV), MEAN DEGREE OF FIRST NEIGHBORS ± STDEV, LARGEST EIGENVALUE OF THE ADJACENCY
MATRIX, MAXIMUM DEGREE kmax AND THE SECOND SMALLEST EIGENVALUE OF THE LAPLACIAN MATRIX (THE SO-CALLED algebraic
connectivity).
Topology N 〈k〉 ± StDev 〈d〉 ± StDev λ1 kmax µN−1
abilene93 93 2.88 ±2.71 6.76 ±2.76 5.016 12 0.07607
cogentco197 197 2.46 ±1.05 2.91 ±0.92 3.778 9 0.00858
er400 400 7.81 ±2.80 8.89 ±1.01 8.848 15 0.90416
powerlaw400 400 2.00 ±3.25 9.47 ±11.81 7.013 47 0.00463
homoge400 400 4.00 ±0.00 4.00 ±0.00 4.000 4 0.09788
bt400 400 3.74 ±2.17 5.44 ±1.61 5.195 11 0.01013
bo1458 1458 2.67 ±3.45 9.65 ±10.74 7.535 56 0.02126
col4158 4158 6.45 ±8.62 11.60 ±9.02 45.616 81 0.03530
col8638 8638 5.74 ±6.45 11.25 ±6.65 31.034 65 0.02441
cost37 37 3.08 ±0.85 3.31 ±0.45 3.399 5 0.15857
europg1494 1494 2.88 ±1.75 4.17 ±1.58 5.027 13 0.00170
fb4039 4039 43.69 ±52.41 105.55 ±91.30 162.373 1045 0.01812
wspg4941 4941 2.66 ±1.79 3.96 ±1.93 7.483 19 0.00076
pgieee118 118 3.03 ±1.56 3.95 ±1.13 4.105 9 0.02714
pgieee300 300 2.72 ±1.54 3.86 ±1.71 4.126 11 0.00938
AS25357 25357 5.91 ±48.03 659.73 ±827.98 103.361 3781 0.10768
AS26475 26475 4.03 ±33.37 471.27 ±644.72 69.642 2628 0.02043
highest mean degree of first neighbors (〈d〉) and maximum degree (kmax), i.e. in AS25357 there is an AS that is
connected to other (kmax) 3781 ASes, and some of them have a high node degree as well. A high kmax is an
indicator of vulnerability, depicting that removal of such a node could seriously damage the network. Networks
with high values of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix (or spectral radius, λ1) and algebraic connectivity
(µN−1) are more robust. In this case, the fb4039 network shows the highest spectral radius and the er400 presents
the highest algebraic connectivity. For this reason, these two networks are supposed to be most robust than the rest
of them in the case of failures.
Regarding the average shortest-path length (〈l〉) it is shown that two power grid networks (europg1494 and
wspg4941) have the higher values and consequently are more vulnerable. This is due to the fact that, traditionally,
power grid networks have a tree-like structure. Furthermore, the average node betweenness centrality (〈b〉) of cost37,
cogentco197 and abilene93 shows that these three topologies have an excess of centrality measures for some nodes,
indicating the vulnerability of networks under targeted failures. The absence of 3-cycles in the clustering coefficient
(〈C〉) measurements reveal that the homoge400 and cost37 lack two-hop paths to re-route the traffic in case of
failure of one of its neighbors. Finally, networks with negative values of assortativity (r) have an excess of radial
links, i.e., links connecting nodes of dissimilar degrees. Such a property is typical of technological networks [19].
7TABLE III
NETWORK FEATURES. THE TABLE DISPLAYS, FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: TOPOLOGY NAME, AVERAGE SHORTEST PATH LENGTH ± STDEV,
NORMALIZED AVERAGE BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY ± STDEV, AVERAGE CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT ± STDEV, AND ASSORTATIVITY
COEFFICIENT |r| ≤ 1.
Topology 〈l〉 ± StDev 〈b〉 ± StDev 〈C〉 ± StDev r
abilene93 3.92 ±1.32 0.0529 ±0.0551 0.51 ±0.48 −0.5130
cogentco197 10.52 ±5.09 0.0585 ±0.0665 0.12 ±0.32 +0.01956
er400 3.13 ±0.73 0.0103 ±0.0037 0.02 ±0.07 −0.07229
powerlaw400 6.01 ±2.16 0.0175 ±0.0594 0.64 ±0.47 −0.16512
homoge400 10.03 ±4.10 0.0276 ±0.0000 0.00 ±0.00 +1.0000
bt400 10.12 ±4.21 0.0202 ±0.0357 0.16 ±0.27 −0.29646
bo1458 6.81 ±2.04 0.0039 ±0.0110 0.56 ±0.47 −0.20954
col4158 6.04 ±1.57 0.0012 ±0.0034 0.71 ±0.35 +0.63919
col8638 5.94 ±1.50 0.0005 ±0.0015 0.65 ±0.37 +0.23892
cost37 4.05 ±1.90 0.0782 ±0.0756 0.00 ±0.00 −0.01510
europg1494 18.88 ±8.73 0.0119 ±0.0304 0.27 ±0.40 −0.11965
fb4039 3.69 ±1.19 0.0006 ±0.0116 0.62 ±0.20 +0.06358
wspg4941 18.98 ±6.50 0.0036 ±0.0160 0.32 ±0.44 +0.00346
pgieee118 6.30 ±2.81 0.0457 ±0.0723 0.22 ±0.36 −0.15257
pgieee300 9.93 ±4.06 0.0299 ±0.0546 0.31 ±0.42 −0.22063
AS25357 3.39 ±0.70 0.0001 ±0.0020 0.73 ±0.36 −0.18540
AS26475 3.87 ±0.90 0.0001 ±0.0020 0.58 ±0.46 −0.19465
This initial network analysis of the considered set of topologies reveals that none of the networks can be considered
as the most robust for all of the metrics. Besides, the vulnerability of the networks is going to differ depending on
the considered type of multiple failures. As a consequence, it is necessary to define new metrics able to characterize
how robust a network is in a specific scenario. The following two sections present two new measures to evaluate
network vulnerability in the case of epidemic-like and cascading failures.
III. EPIDEMIC-LIKE FAILURES
Throughout the history of mankind there have been many diseases that have spread quickly, becoming an epidemic
or even a pandemic. As a result, many epidemic outbreaks have ravaged human civilizations from the Middle Ages
until today. For instance, the devastating Influenza epidemic of 1918 (the third greatest plague in history) claimed
21 million lives and affected over half the world’s population [20].
Epidemic models are used to model the spreading of events (e.g. failures) in several types of complex networks.
These models have been used in a wide variety of research fields. For instance, in [21] the authors used characteristics
of epidemic spreading to model the fire propagation on a forest. In [22], the authors used epidemic models to show
that emotional states spread like infectious diseases across social networks. In [23] it was shown that there are
certain network structures that facilitate the propagation of new ideas, behaviors or technologies. In the last years,
8online social networks (OSNs) have also been the focus of study. For instance, in [24] the authors studied how to
control virus propagation in OSNs. Finally, although no commercial references (or reports) have been found with
respect to the propagation of failures in telecommunication networks, several works have focused on analyzing
the consequences of epidemic attacks on the services provided by such networks [25], [26], [27]. Additionally,
a framework to eradicate epidemic failure has been recently proposed in [28]. Nonetheless, to the best of our
knowledge, no methods to detect the most vulnerable nodes of a complex network in the case of epidemic failures
have been proposed. Therefore, a first step would be to define network measures to characterize all nodes under
such failure scenarios.
A. Epidemic Models
Epidemic dynamics in complex networks have undergone extensive research [29], [30] [31], [32], [33]. As
a consequence, many epidemic models have been proposed and several families are described in the literature
(see Chapter 8 in [34], Chapter 17 in [35] and Chapter 14 in [36]). The first family, called Susceptible-Infected
(SI) considers individuals as being either susceptible (S) or infected (I). This family assumes that the infected
individuals will remain infected forever, and so can be used for worst case propagation (S → I). Another family is
the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) group, which considers that a susceptible individual can become infected
on contact with another infected individual, then recovers with some probability of becoming susceptible again.
Therefore, individuals will change their state from susceptible to infected, and vice versa, several times (S  I).
The Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Susceptible (SEIS) model is based on the SIS model, and takes into consideration
the exposed or latent period of the disease (S → E → I → S). The third broad family is Susceptible-Infected-
Removed (SIR), which extends the SI model to take into account a removed state. In the SIR model, an individual
can be infected just once because when the infected individual recovers, becomes either immune or dead, and will
no longer pass the infection onto others (S → I → R). Finally, there are two families that extend the SIR family:
Susceptible-Infected-Detected-Removed (SIDR) and Susceptible-Infected-Removed-Susceptible (SIRS). The first one
adds a Detected (D) state, and is used to study virus throttling, which is an automatic mechanism for restraining
or slowing down the spread of diseases (S → I → D → R). The second one considers that after an individual
becomes removed, it remains in that state for a specific period of time and then goes back to the susceptible state
(S → I → R→ S).
Regarding communication networks, an extension of the SIS model, which is called Susceptible-Infected-Disabled-
Susceptible (SIDS), was proposed in [25] in order to overcome the limitations of the SIS model with respect to
optical transport networks. The SIDS model (SusceptibleInfected→Disabled→Susceptible) is proposed as one of
the first models to consider real telecommunication networks features and it relates each state to a functionality of
the network devices. In addition, other epidemic models have also been proposed for wireless telecommunication
networks [37].
In this paper we propose a new network measure taking into account the SIS model, which is characterized by
two probabilities: (a) β, the probability of being infected by an already infected node; and (b) δ, the probability of
9an infected node to recover and become susceptible again. However, our proposal can be also applied to any other
epidemic model and we plan to do so in the future.
Furthermore, according to [33] and from the following equation:
s =
β
δ
λ1 (1)
where s is the epidemic intensity and λ1 is the network’s largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, which has been
typically used to predict network robustness, when s > 1 an epidemic survives and the spread of the infection might
never die. Thus, in order to obtain comparable results between networks with respect to our proposal (epidemic
survivability), s must be a parameter of our new measure.
In this work we have fixed s = 3 for all networks, in order to obtain comparable results, and we have obtained
a specific β value for each network from the equation β = sδλ .
B. Epidemic Survivability
Here we present our new network measure called epidemic survivability (ES). We define our proposal as the
probability for each node of a given network to be eventually infected (i.e., in a large enough amount of time
steps), given a specific epidemic intensity (s). This probability of each node asymptotically reaches a stationary
state, according to simulations and theoretical models. Epidemic survivability can be described as the proportion of
time for which each node of a given network has been infected for a given s, in a large enough period of time, as
shown in Eq. 2:
ESi(s) =
time for which node i has been infected
total time
i = 1, . . . , N (2)
where N is the number of nodes of the network. As a result, ES has a value between 0 and 1 for each node,
where higher the value, more vulnerable is the node under the specified epidemic scenario. Formally, from the SIS
model, epidemic survivability can be computed with the following equation:
ES∗i =
1
1 + (βδ
∑
j∼iES
∗
j )
−1 i = 1, . . . , N (3)
where ∗ means at the stationary state and j ∼ i is the set of neighbors of node i. Here, it is assumed that δ and
s are given as parameters and β is obtained from the equation β = sδλ1 . Thus, it can be observed that Eq. 3 is a
recursive formula and must be initialized with a value. We define this initialization of the probabilities in Eq. 4:
ES∗i,approx = (1−
1
s
) i = 1, . . . , N (4)
which corresponds to the solution of Eq. 3 for the case of a homogeneous/regular network. Moreover, a procedure
for computing epidemic survivability is provided in Algorithm 1. As it can be observed, the method requires five
parameters: the network G and four constants (s, δ, k and tol). The first two steps (lines 3 and 4) compute the
largest eigenvalue of the given network and thus obtain the β value of the epidemic model. Then, all probabilities
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are initialized as stated in Eq. 4 (lines 5 to 7). Therefore, in the main loop of line 8 the new probability of each
node is computed as defined in Eq. 3 (lines 9 to 11). After that, the absolute error is checked (lines 12 to 14)
and if it results lower than the given tolerance (tol) then the algorithm ends, and returns the array containing the
epidemic survivability of each node of the network. If the absolute error is still higher than tol another iteration is
performed.
Algorithm 1 Compute epidemic survivability.
Require: s ≥ 1, d > 0, k > 0, tol > 0, connected G
1: Input: a graph G and the constants s (epidemic intensity), δ (repairing rate), k (maximum number of iterations)
and tol (tolerance).
2: Output: an array containing the epidemic survivability of each node.
3: λ← spectralRadius(G) {largest eigenvalue}
4: β ← s∗δλ
5: for all v ∈ vertexSet(G) do
6: PES [v] = (1− 1s )
7: end for
8: for c = 1→ k do
9: for all v ∈ vertexSet(G) do
10: Paux[v] =
1
1+( βδ
∑
j∼v PES [j])−1
11: end for
12: if (‖Paux − PES‖) < tol then
13: break
14: end if
15: PES ← Paux
16: end for
17: return PES
C. The distribution
When computing the epidemic survivability for the nodes of a network, according to a specified set of parameters,
it is interesting to analyze the distribution of ES values. If these values are sorted, for example, in descending order,
it facilitates the comparison between network topologies when considering the same failure propagation scenario
for all of them. This approach is illustrated in Fig. 3 which displays the epidemic survivability distribution, the
ES of each node, for the 17 networks in a specific epidemic scenario. As can be observed, the two AS networks
(AS25357 and AS26475) together with the two collaboration networks (col4158 and col8638) show the lowest
ES distributions, demonstrating that such networks are more robust than the rest of networks, in the case of an
epidemic-like failure with epidemic intensity s = 3.
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Fig. 3. Epidemic survivability distribution, sorted from major to minor values, of all networks. In this case the set of parameters has been:
s = 3, δ = 0.3, k = 2000 and tol = 1e−8. The X-axis shows the nodes of the network, their index not showed for the sake of clarity.
It is worth noting that different types of complex networks show different ES distribution curves. While AS and
collaboration networks show power-law-like curves, power grids, telecommunication networks, synthetic networks
and the biological network depict more smooth-decreasing curves. On one hand, curves showing a rapid decrease
(i.e. power-law-like profile) would be expected in complex networks regarding critical infrastructures. This is due
to the fact that only a small portion of the nodes of the network would be highly vulnerable, and consequently, it
would require less effort (e.g. economical) from the network engineer or operator to protect it. On the other hand,
regarding social networks one could expect different curve profiles, depending on the purpose of the social network
(e.g. a country’s government interested in controlling its social networks would prefer flatter curves, because there
would not be any node with a high spreading potential).
IV. CASCADING FAILURES
A cascading failure event is typically triggered by a single point of failure (i.e. one component) that leads to
a domino effect, causing other parts of the network to fail. When such failures occur they can affect significant
percentages of the world’s population. For instance, according to [38], in 2012 a cascading failure in North India
left more than 300 million people without power.
Cascading failure models have been used to understand these dynamic multiple failures in different types of
complex networks. The power grids are the most remarkable example where cascading failures can occur. There
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are several works which have studied the impact of cascading failures on different power grids: Italy [39], North
America [40] and Europe [41]. However, cascading failures are not limited to power grids, but any load/capacity
related complex network. For example, the authors of [42] stated that two types of cascading failures can occur
in backbone telecommunication networks. Other works such as [43] and [44] have focused on the IP layer and
optical layer of communication networks, respectively. Moreover, cascading failures have been also studied in
socio-technological networks [45]. Other examples of cascading failures include biological, electronic and financial
networks.
Although the authors of [46] proposed a robustness metric for power grid networks in the case of targeted attacks,
to the best of our knowledge, there is not any metric which can be generally applied to any kind of cascading
failure or complex network. Therefore, with the purpose of providing the network scientific community with such
a measure, in this section we define cascading survivability.
A. Cascading Failure Models
Cascading failures have been extensively studied in the literature. Some of the most well-known models are
presented next. In [47] one of the first cascading failure models was presented, which focused on random complex
networks. Contemporarily, the authors of [48] presented a simple but functional model. Later on, the model was
enhanced in [49] by keeping an auxiliary cost matrix related with the efficiency metric [50], [51]. Furthermore,
in [52] the authors proposed an analytically tractable loading-dependent cascading failure model. In [53] an AC
blackout model representing most of the interactions observed in cascading failures was presented. Recently, in
[54] a cascading failure model for inter-domain routing systems was presented. Moreover, the authors proposed
two metrics to assess the impact of a cascading failure: the proportion of failure nodes and the proportion of failed
links.
As previously stated in this work, our objective is to define a metric able to characterize the vulnerability of
the elements of a network (i.e. in this case nodes) under cascading failures. To do so, we have chosen the model
presented in [48]. According to this model, each node j is related with a load Lj . The load at each node is the
node betweenness centrality, i.e. the number of shortest paths passing through the node. Then, the capacity can be
defined as a proportional value to the initial load Lj , as denoted by Eq. 5:
Cj = (1 + α) · Lj j = 1, 2, . . . , N (5)
where N is the number of nodes of the network and α, the tolerance parameter of the model, is a constant that must
be α ≥ 0. This parameter is related with the concept of capacity dimensioning of a network, which is of paramount
importance at the designing phase of a network (e.g. a critical infrastructure such as a power grid). An appropriate
level of over-dimensioning can prevent a network from cascading failures. However, a higher α typically involves
a higher economical budget. Therefore, network engineers must seek a trade-off between these two factors.
As defined by the model in [48], we focus on cascades triggered by the removal of a single node. This event, in
general, causes changes in the distribution of shortest paths. As a result, after an initial node failure, the new load
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of the nodes (L′j) might be different from the initial load (Lj). Then, for each node, if the expression of Eq. 6 is
satisfied:
L′j > Cj (6)
the node j overloads and fails, which might cause subsequent overloading failures on the rest of nodes of the
network.
Finally, we note that in the results presented further in this section we have assumed an α = 0.05 for all networks,
with the purpose of allowing comparison among them.
B. Cascading Survivability
Our new network measure called cascading survivability (CS) is presented below. Cascading survivability
evaluates how potentially injurious a node is according to a specific cascading failure scenario. In other words, CS
can be described as shown in Eq. 7:
CSi(α) =
the number of nodes that fail if node i initially fails
all nodes in the network− 1 1 = 1, . . . , N (7)
where N is the number of nodes of the network. As observed, α is a parameter of CS, what means that for different
α distinct CS values might be obtained. Cascading survivability takes values in the range between 0 and 1 for
each node, where higher the value, more harmful is the node under a specific cascading failure scenario.
We have defined a procedure to compute the cascading survivability of the nodes of a network, which is presented
in Algorithm 2. As shown, the method requires two parameters: the network G and the tolerance parameter α. First
of all, the initial load and capacity of each node is computed (lines 4 to 7). Then, an initial failure is caused, for
each one of the nodes of the given network, one at a time (lines 8 to 20). For each initial failure (line 9) and as
well as at each step of the spreading of the cascade, (lines 10 to 19), the new load of the remaining nodes of the
network is computed (line 13). If the new load becomes higher than the capacity at any step, then the cascading
survivability of the node that initially triggered the failure is increased (lines 14 to 17). Finally, the CS of each
node is normalized (lines 21 to 23).
C. The distribution
When computing the cascading survivability for the nodes of a network, given a network and a specific α, it
is worth noting the utility of analysing the distribution of the CS values, as previously illustrated for epidemic
survivability in Section III-C.
By sorting the CS values in descending order it is possible to compare different networks, according to a specific
cascading failure scenario denoted by α. Fig. 4 shows the CS distribution of 15 of the networks considered in this
work, in the case of a cascading failure with α = 0.05. It is interesting to note that most of the networks show a
bimodal CS distribution. This means that the nodes of such networks can be clearly divided in two groups: harmful
and not significant in the case of a cascading failure. This behavior has been observed in other works such as [55].
14
Algorithm 2 Compute cascading survivability.
Require: α ≥ 0, connected G
1: Input: a graph G and the constant α (tolerance parameter).
2: Output: an array containing the cascading survivability of each node.
3: N ← vertexSize(G))
{initializing load and capacity of each node}
4: for all v ∈ vertexSet(G) do
5: L[v] = NodeBetweennessCentrality(G)
6: C[v] = (1 + α) · L[v]
7: end for
8: for all v ∈ vertexSet(G) do
9: F ← add(v) {add node v to the list of nodes that are going to fail}
10: while F is not empty do
11: G′ ← removeNodes(G,F ) {removes from G all nodes in F . After the operation F is empty.}
12: for all u ∈ vertexSet(G′) do
13: L′[u] = NodeBetweennessCentrality(G′)
14: if L′[u] > C[u] then
15: F ← add(u)
16: CS[v] = CS[v] + 1 {increase in 1 the number of nodes that have failed due to the initial
failure of v}
17: end if
18: end for
19: end while
20: end for
21: for all v ∈ vertexSet(G) do
22: CS[v] = CS[v]N−1
23: end for
24: return CS
Moreover, as observed, depending on the network the percentage of harmful nodes might vary. For instance, the
fb4039 and the er400 networks start the distribution around 0.9, however it is in the former where only a 5% of the
nodes represents a threat in the case of cascading failures, while in the latter it is about 55%. Finally, different types
of complex networks show different CS distribution curves, just like they show different ES curves as represented
in Section III-C.
15
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
Ca
sca
din
g S
urv
iva
bil
ity
Node
abilene93bo1458bt400col4158col8638cogentco197cost37er400europg1494fb4039homoge400wspg4941pgieee118pgieee300powerlaw400
Fig. 4. Cascading survivability distribution, sorted from major to minor values, of all networks. In this case we have considered alpha = 0.05.
The X-axis shows the nodes of the network, their index not showed for the sake of clarity.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed two new measures to evaluate the vulnerability of complex networks in two
different dynamic multiple failure scenarios: epidemic-like and cascading failures.
Firstly, we have proposed a new network measure called epidemic survivability (ES), which describes the
vulnerability of each node of a network under a specific epidemic-like failure propagation scenario. Besides, a
procedure to compute our novel measure has been provided. Sorting the ES distribution of values of all nodes
of a network in descending order, it is possible to analyze which nodes would be more vulnerable in the case of
an epidemic failure. Furthermore, using this ES distribution, network vulnerability can be compared for a specific
epidemic scenario.
Secondly, we have presented a new network measure called cascading survivability (CS), which characterizes
how potentially dangerous a node is according to a specific cascading failure scenario. In addition, we have provided
a procedure to compute CS. Then, as for the epidemic survivability metric, we have noted the inherent usability
related to the CS distribution.
Lastly, we have computed ES and CS for the set of networks considered in this work, being each measure
dependent on a specific failure scenario. Results have shown that distinct types of complex networks might react
differently under the same dynamic multiple failure. In addition, results have revealed that a complex network
might be more or less vulnerable, depending on the specific type of multiple failure scenario (i.e. epidemic-like
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or cascading failures). For instance, while the cogentco197 network shows a smooth decreasing curve of ES, the
same network shows a bimodal distribution of CS, where about 25% of nodes are not dangerous in the case of
cascading failures.
To conclude, the methodology that we have followed to evaluate the vulnerability of the nodes of a network in
the case of dynamic multiple failures might be used in further investigations, considering other types of failures or
models. This methodology is defined below:
1) Define the set of networks to be analysed.
2) Determine the failure scenario.
3) Choose a suitable model to simulate the failures.
4) Define the value of all the parameters of the model.
5) For each network, compute the vulnerability of the elements (e.g. nodes) of the network analytically or by
performing simulations.
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